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WAIVER OF TORT AND SUIT IN ASSUMPSIT.
This subject has already been developed exhaustively and with
great accuracy.' Yet it is a subject in which there has always
been great confusion of thought, and the decisions are in hopeless
conflict. This is due to the fact that the substantive principles
of the common law were developed as mere incidents to forms of
action and procedure. The common law system of procedure
afforded no remedy in many cases where common notions of jus-
tice acknowledged the existence of a right. The system, therefore,
had to change, as it ever must continue to change. Before the
modes and forms of procedure had crystalized into a system, these
changes were easy. The king's courts could make new law by
authority of the king. But the kings grew weak and the sys-
tem of procedure grew stiff. Changes in it grew hard, and many
acknowledged rights were without a remedy. New remedies must
be invented for these rights, or old remedies must be expanded to
include them. The latter alternative was easier because it in-
volved less appearance of innovation. The greatest single step
in applying it was the Statute of Westminister II, when Edward
I and his law-givers authorized the granting of writs in
consimili casu.
This is not the place to explain that statute, or to trace the
history of that action curiously called an "action on the case" and
its descendants. That is now common knowledge to legal his-
torians.2 But it suffices to say that this statute and the applica-
' Keener: Quasi-Contracts, 159-213.
2Ames: History of Assumpsit and other articles in Essays in Anglo-
American Legal History, Vol. III. Street: Foundations of Legal Liability.
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tion of old remedies to new rights caused lawyers and judges,
from that day to this, to describe the new rights in the same terms
as the old rights. The habit is inveterate and the results are
often pernicious. The new rights are actually different from the
old rights, but it requires a clear head for analysis and some
knowledge of legal history to tell them apart and to understand
their true character. A great many of those rights now usually
referred to as quasi-contractual are among these newly recognized
rights. But they have long been described in the terms ap-
plicable to real contracts and enforced as if they were really con-
tractual. An examination of the cases dealing with them will
quickly demonstrate how many are the judges who do not under-
stand their true character, and how easy it is to be led astray by
the misleading terminology .
The term "contract," defining it according to the substance and
not according to its history,3 applies to one large class of tran-
sactions. The great distinctive feature of these transactions is
the agreement of the parties, the mutual assent, the meeting of
the minds. This agreement is the origin of the obligation at-
tached by the law and called contractual. The obligation not to
commit a crime or a tort, or to repair the damage caused by a
crime or a tort, is not contractual. Further, the character of the
obligation is determined by the existence of agreement and not
by the kind of evidence by which the existence of agreement is
proved to a court. This evidence is of two general kinds, the evi-
dence of words used by the parties, and the evidence of acts other
than words. It is somewhat misleading to refer to these two
kinds of evidence as direct and circumstantial, for in fact words
are just as circumstantial in their character as other acts are.
There is no such thing as direct evidence of agreement. Inten-
tion is a purely mental phenomenon. If it could be laid bare by
a psycho-surgical operation, the one who saw or felt it could give
what the law calls direct evidence. No one else can. Contracts,
however, are often classified in accordance with the kind of evi-
dence given to establish them. If it is the evidence of words, they
3 We should not here define "contract" according to the historical
uses of that term, or according to the forms of action called contractual,
for it is here our object to get at the substance and nature of things and
not at their vestments or their history. For this reason a work on Quasi-
Contracts should include judgments, statutory duties, and the like, evert
though, as one author contends, they were real debts,. and all debts were
historically called contracts.
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are called express contracts. If it is the evidence of acts, they are
called implied contracts. But as shown above, both are inferences
from the facts proved.
It is important to note that either kind of evidence may lead to
a false conclusion. The court may decide that there was an
agreement when in fact there was none. It is as difficult to de-
termine the intention with which words were used as it is to
determine the intention with which acts were done. So then, a
verbal or express contract, as found by the court, is no more cer-
tainly a real contract than is a contract implied from acts. Prac-
tically, it is necessary for us to say that any agreement found by
the court to exist is a real agreement. In law as in metaphysics,
human beings must judge of reality by the evidence and accord-
ing to their capacity of understanding it. To them the real is
that which seems real. The reality that does not appear has no
practical existence. It is of no consequence that the contract
might not appear real to beings other than human.
Some authors attempt to determine the character of a transac-
tion by the form of action applicable to it at common law.4 But
these forms were not mutually exclusive, and the fact that one
may sue in indebitatus assumpst on the common counts does not
prove that there was or was not a real contract, or even an
express contract.5 The distinction between a real contract, ex-
press or implied, and a quasi-contract is to be found in the pres-
ence or absence of the element of agreement. The forms of
action available for their enforcement are the same.
The logical distinctions between contract and quasi-contract
seem to fade away into obscurity, when a close study is made of
the subject of "conditions implied by the law," or of cases holding
a party according to the legal meaning of his words wholly ir-
respective of the fact that his real intention was otherwise.8 A
discussion of these cases cannot be attempted here. They seem
to be combinations of quasi-contract with real contract; though it
is usually said that where there is a real and valid contract cover-
ing a situation, the law will not "imply" a contract.7 They will
4 See Street: Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. II, p. 201.
e. g. See Lewis v. Campbell, 8 M. G. & S., 541.
6 Mansfield v. Hodgdon, 147 Mass., 304; Ayer v. W. U. Tel. Co., 79
Me., 493.
7 Toussaint v. Martinnant, 2 T. R., ioo; Roosevelt v. Mark, 6 Johns.
Ch., 266. Compare Lewis v. Campbell, 8 M. G. & S., 541.
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often do so, however, in cases where the express contract was un-
enforceable or voidable.
The least thought given to the matter will convince one that
where one is allowed to waive a tort and to sue in assumpsit, the
obligation of the defendant is not really contractual. It is not
based on agreement or consent. The chief thing it has in common
with a promissory obligation is that it can be enforced by an
action in that stereotyped form called assumpsit. But sometimes
not even the least thought has been given, and the result is un-
reasonable conflict, bad logic, and bad law. The following is of-
fered as an outline of the cases where a tort has been supposed to
give rise to a quasi-contractual obligation, as well as the delictual
one. A full discussion of all the topics cannot be given here.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLE.
A. An Unjust Enrichment.
B. Theory of Ratification.




a. Sold for money.
b. Traded for land or goods.
c. Consumed or kept.
d. Used and returned.
B. Property Obtained by Fraud or Duress.
C. Infringement of Incorporeal Rights.
8 In assumpsit to enforce this obligation, infancy of the defendant is
not a good defense. Bristow v. Eastman, i Esp., 172; Catis v. Phalen,
2 How., 376. Nor is insanity. See Sceva v. True, 53 N. H., 627. Neither
should coverture be a gobd defense; hence dicta in Nat'l Trust Co. v.
Gleason, 77 N. Y., 400, indicating that the liability of a married woman
in assumpsit must be based upon the liability of her separate estate should
be disapproved.
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III. TORTS AFFECTING REAL PROPERTY.
A. Use and Occupation by Trespassers.
B. Chattels Severed by Disseisor.
C. Chattels Converted by a Mere Trespasser.





E. Slave. (See also II, A, 2, d.)
V. GENERAL DOCTRINES.
A. Application of Statute of Limitations.
B. Survival of Actions.
C. Set-Off and Counterclaim.
D. Election of Remedies.
I. Against a sole tort feasor.
2. Against joint tort feasors.
3. Against successive tort feasors.
4. Question of title to converted goods.
E. Measure of Recovery.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLE-A. An Unjust Enrichment. Since the
common law furnished a variety of actions sounding in tort, it
may appear that permission to use assumpsit also is entirely un-
necessary. It will be found, indeed, that the courts have per-
mitted the use of assumpsit only in those cases where the facts
show a shadow of excuse for asserting that the parties have
agreed. It is this shadow of an excuse that has often deceived
the courts into believing that there was actually a contract re-
lation, and it is probable that had the courts not been so de-
ceived, the remedy in assumpsit would have been extended far
less than it has been. The one excuse that is common to all the
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cases with which we are now dealing will be found to. be the
existence of a moral obligation arising out of an unjust enrich-
ment. It is not enough that a moral obligation exists, for such
an obligation exists in all cases of crimes and torts. If A batters
B's face, or breaks B's window, or shoots B's cow, or destroys
B's grain, a duty to act certainly devolves upon A immediately.
He should repair the damage, and the law will compel him to re-
pair the damage, but B cannot use the action of assumpsit. B
can use that action only in case A's wrongful act has resulted in
A's unjust enrichment. In such case A has a sum of money or
other property in his possession, and he is under a duty of giving
it to B. This duty has much the appearance of a debt. A is said
to owe B something. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the
courts should have permitted B to use that highly flexible and
generally beneficial action of assumpsit. It had aliready become
a proper action to bring for the collection of a debt,9 the words
of the plaintiff's declaration being indebitatus assumpsit. But
there must be something to make it appear that the defendant is
indebted. That thing is an unjust enrichment. This enrichment
must be of such a sort that the courts can see the applicability of
one of the common counts in assumpsit9a Obviously, a count upon
a special promise cannot be maintained; but the law had learned
now to "imply" a promise where there was money had and re-
ceived by the defendant, or where goods had been sold to him
without fixing a price, or where services had been rendered for
him without an agreed wage, and in other cases. To -maintain
any of these common counts, it will be found that the defendant
must have received a benefit, and this is as true of quasi-con-
tractual actions where the law is asked to construe a promise, as
it is of really contractual actions where the defendant impliedly
promised in fact. An action on a special promise may be main-
tained if the promisee incurred a detriment in return therefor,
whether the promisor got a benefit or not; but a debt cannot exist
unless the defendant has received something, and so the action of
debt and the related action of indebitatus assumpsit cannot be
maintained unless the defendant has received a benefit. This is
the whole doctrine of consideration.
So it must again be stated, a tort may be waived and a suit in
assumpsit maintained only when the tort feasor has been unjustly
9 Slade's Cases (i6o2), 4 Co. Rep., 92a.
9a But see Bachelder v. Fisk, x7 Mass., 464.
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enriched by his tort. 0 In no case can the recovery in assumpsit
exceed that enrichment."
There are a few cases that are apparently in conflict with this
principle. They are not numerous; some of them are capable of a
fairly plausible explanation; the others must be regarded as
erroneous.12 Where the payment of money has been unjustly com-
pelled by one who sends an agent to receive it, the agent has been
held personally liable in assumpsit, even though he has turned the
money over to his principal in accordance with the latter's in-
structions. But this should be permitted only where the payment
was made to the agent under protest and with notice that the
agent himself would be held responsible for the amount.'8 In
such case the injured party perhaps has the right to regard the
money as having enriched the agent personally. If the wrong-
doer has once been enriched, it is of course, immaterial what he
does with the money. He is liable in assumpsit, even though he
has given the money away, or has lost it at roulette or on the
stock exchange.' 4
Where the defendant's tort enriches him only negatively, by
enabling him to save money when he would otherwise have had
to spend it, it is perhaps generally held that he is not liable in
assumpsit, but only in a tort action.'15 Probably the rule should be
otherwise.'8
10 Hambly v. Trott, Cowp., 371; Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370; People
v. Gibbs, 9 Wend., 29; Webster v. Drinkwater, 5 Greenlee (Me.), 319;
Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind., 44o; Fanson v. Linsley, 2o Kan., 235; Downs
v. Finnegan, 58 Minn., 112; Reynolds v. Padgett, 94 Ga., 347. Keener:
Quasi-Contracts, i6o.
11 Huganir v. Cotter, 102 Wis., 323. And see infra, V, E.
12 e. g. Eades v. Vandeput, 5 East, 39a, 39.
1 Young v. Marshall, 8 Bing., 43; Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370;
Elliott v. Swartwout, IO Pet., 137. The case of Hindmarch v. Hoffman, 127
Pa., 284, can perhaps be explained on this ground; but if not, it must be
disapproved. The rule there adopted certainly puts a bank or other
depositary in a.very unfortunate position.
14 For similar reasons a principal may be held liable in assumpsit, even
though his agent to perpetrate the wrong received the money and absconded
with it. Nat'l Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N. Y., 400.
15 Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 24 Ch. D., 439.
18 Sollers v. Lawrence, Willes, 413; Keener: Quasi-Contracts, 163-165;
note in Scott's Cases on Q. C., 99. The dissenting opinion of Bagallay,
L. J., in Phillips v. Homfray, supra, is strongly persuasive. Compare also
cases of assumpsit by a surety to compel contribution by a co-surety, or by
one whose goods have been jettisoned to enforce the doctrine of general
average.
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B. Theory of Ratification. Another theory upon which the
action of assumpsit has been sustained is that the plaintiff may
ratify the defendant's act, and thus make right that which before
was wrong.'7 But this is only another effort on the part of the
courts to find a real contractual relation. It is mere shadow with
no substance. The doctrine of ratification properly applies only to.
cases of real contracts made voidable at the option of one party
thereto by fraud, infancy, or the like. In the law of agency it
applies only where one has contracted on behalf of another and in
that other's name. In all such cases the purpose of the ratification
is the recognition of an express contract. In some of these cases
the ratification amounts to a waiver of a tort, but it also amounts
to an election to stand upon an express contract.'8  In many of
these cases there is no tort to waive; in all of them it is an ex-
press contract that is ratified, and not a tort. The doctrine of
ratification is inapplicable in cases of indebitatus assumpsit used
as a remedy for a tort wholly independent of a contract.19
II. TORTS AFFECTING PERSONAL PROPERTY-A. Chattels
Converted.-i. Money. Where money has been tortiously taken,
the wrongdoer may be sued in assumpsit, the count being for
money had and received.2 ° Of course an action cannot be main-
tained against an innocent holder for value, to whom the money
has been paid by the wrongdoer.?'
2. Goods-a. Where goods have been tortiously taken, the
wrongdoer may be held in a count for money had and received,
in case he has converted the goods into money."2 If the conver-
7 See Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y., I61, and cf. Tottenham & Beding-
field's case (573), 2 Leon., 24. But see below, V, A and V, D, 2 and 3.
18 Campbell v. Fleming, I Adol. & El., 4o; Marsh v. Keating, 1 Mon-
tagu & Ayrton (H. of L.), 582. In Vaughan v. Matthews, 13 Q. B., 187,
the doctrine of ratification is properly held not to apply although in that
case a quasi-contract should perhaps have been recognized on other
grounds.
29 Huffman v. Hughlett, ii Lea (Tenn.), 549; Rice v. Reed (igoo),
i Q. B., 54; Bosanquet, J., in Young v. Marshall, 8 Bing., 43; Keener:
Quasi-Contracts, 167.
20 Clark v. Shee, Cowp., 197; Neate v. Harding, 6 Exch., 349; Catts v.
Phalen, 2 How., 376; Lockwood v. Kelsea, 41 N. H., I85; Hindmarch v.
Hoff-man, 127 Pa., 284; Brown v. Brown, 4o Hun., 418; Western Assur-
Co. v. Towle, 65 Wis., 247; State Nat'l Bank v. Payne, 56 Ill. App., 147.
21 Stephens v. Board of Ed., 79 N. Y., 183; Bank of Charleston v.
Bank of State, 13 Rich. L. (S. C.), 291.
22Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. Raym., 1216.
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ter of the goods was the defendant's agent, the defendant is liable
in assumpsit, even though he is innocent.2 3  The right to sue in
assumpsit is generally regarded as accruing at the time the
wrongdoer receives the money.24
b. Where the wrongdoer has traded the goods for other prop-
erty, he may be held liable in assumpsit in case the other property
has been taken at an agreed price, the seller having the right to
receive money, but commuting it into goods.25 It is then regarded
that the wrongdoer has received money and invested it. This is
a mere subterfuge, however, to support a count for money had
and received. The count really applicable is one for goods sold
and delivered.
c. Where the wrongdoer has not transferred the goods at
all, but has consumed or kept them, many courts hold that he may
be sued in assumpsit as for goods sold to him.2 6 Perhaps the
weight of authority is contra.27  The cases contra should be dis-
approved. There is really no magic in the receipt of money, out
of which to construct a contractual relation. The wrongdoer is
a tort feasor, not a contractor, whether he sells the converted
goods or keeps them. He is under the same sort of a duty in
either case, and it is no more difficult for the law to enforce that
duty in a count for goods sold than in a count for money had and
received.
d. Where the goods taken have been used and returned, it
has wrongfully deprived the plaintiff, may be recovered in in-
assumpsit.28 The fiction of a hiring is then indulged.
In all of the cases of conversion, the recovery in assumpsit
must be limited to the amount of the wrongdoer's enrichment.
28 Marsh v. Keating, i Montagu & Ayrton, 582.
24 But see infra, V. A.
2 5 Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick., 133, and see Kidney "v. Persons, 41 Vt., 386.
26 Hill v. Perrott, 3 Taunton, 274; Roth v. Palmer, 27 Barb., 652;
Kirkman v. Philips, 7 Heisk., 222; Phelps v. Church, 99 Fed., 683; Crown
Cycle Co. v. Brown, 39 Ore., 285; Ferrill v. Mooney, 33 Tex., 219; Roberts
v. Evans, 43 Cal., 38o; Downs v. Finnegan, 58 Minn., I12; Braithwaite v.
Akin, 3 N. D., 365. Keener: Quasi-Contracts, x93.
27 Watson v. Stever, 25 Mich., 386; Whipple v. Stephens, 25 R. I., 563;
Kidney v. Persons, 41 Vt., 386; Bowman v. Brotuning, 17 Ark., 599, and
Keener: Q.-C., supra.
28 Fanson v. Linsley, 20 Kan., 235; Hambly v. Trott, Cowper, 371
(dictum), and see below, IV.
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B. Property Obtained by Fraud or Duress. The rules laid
down in relation to goods converted properly apply here ;29 but
there are some special questions to be answered. When credit is
obtained tortiously, the agreement may of course be avoided and
the wrongdoer held at once in a tort action. It would seem that
the injured party would then, as in the case of any other tort re-
sulting in enrichment, have the choice of suing in a tort action or
of suing in assumpsit. It has been properly held that he has such
a choice.80 The cases contra3 ' rest upon the incorrect idea that
suing in assumpsit is an affirmation of the contract. It is, of
course, true, that a voidable contract canno: be affirmed in part
and avoided in part. So here the defrauded party cannot sue for
the contract price before the term of credit has expired. A suit
for the contract price is a suit in express assumpsit on the ex-
press contract; but a suit against a tort feasor for the amount
of his enrichment is in indebitatus assumpsit, and pre-supposes no
contract whatever. The courts have often erroneously supposed
that it does pre-suppose a real contract relation.
On the subject of duress also, there has been some confusion
of thought. This is not the place to discuss the whole matter.
The term has been used to denote violence or imprisonment,
actual or threatened, sufficient to render voidable a contract other-
wise valid. Where such violence or imprisonment amounts to a
tort, it is doubtful whether a suit in assumpsit to recover money
obtained by the duress, would amount to a waiver of the tort at
all. It could not be such a waiver where the violence was to-
ward a third person, some near relative of the person whose will
was overpowered. An action of assumpsit by the latter would be
quite consistent with a contemporaneous action of trespass by the
third person. Further, it does not appear that they would be in-
consistent if maintained at the same time by the same person. If
A batters B and thereby causes B to give up property, perhaps B
could maintain both trespass and trover. If so, he can maintain
20 e. g. Abbotts v. Barry, 2 Brod. & Bing., 369.
30 Roth v. Palmer, 27 Barb., 652; Crown Cycle Co. v. Brown, 39 Ore.,
285; Dietz v. Sutcliffe, 8o Ky., 650; Keener: Q.-C., 196-199.
3i Kellogg v. Turpie, 93 Ill., 265; Ferguson v. Carrington, 9 B. & C.,
59, and Selway v. Fogg, 5 M. & W., 83, are both to the same effect, but in
both cases there was really no disaffirmance of the fraud and the plaintiff
was keeping benefits under the contract, so that he could not have sued in
tort either. Of course the existence of a right to sue in tort is a pre-
requisite to a suit in indebitatus assumpsit in these cases.
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both trespass and assumpsit, though he could not maintain both
trover and assumpsit.
The term duress has also been used to denote such an amount
of improper influence, other than violence or imprisonment, as
will prevent a payment from being voluntary. In this sense it is
not sufficient to set aside an otherwise valid contract; but it is
sufficient to enable one making a payment to recover in assumpsit,
in cases where there was no consideration given for the money
paid, or where for any other reason there was no contract at all.
Title to the money did not pass by contract, for there was none;
and the duress shows that there was no voluntary gift. It is in
this sense only that there is such a thing as duress of goods. In
some cases of this sort there is no tort to be waived; but in all
such cases, whether the duress amounts to a tort or not, the one
paying the money may recover it in assumpsit. If instead of
money, one has been influenced to deliver other property, he may
substitute assumpsit for a tort action in accordance with the
principles set out above under II, A.
C. Infringement of Incorporeal Rights. Where one tortiously
infringes another's incorporeal rights, as for example a patent
right, and has made a profit thereby, such profit is an unjust en-
richment, and it has been held that assumpsit will lie.8 2 The
remedy may often preferably be by bill in equity for an account-
ing, because of the complicated nature of the account, but in
simpler cases assumpsit for money had and received should lie.
There is ample authority for the use of assumpsit, this form
having in fact supplanted the former common law action of
account.38 So also, the profits of an office of which the defendant
has wrongfully deprived the plaintiff, may be recovered in in-
debitatus assumpsit.84 In this last case the measure of damages is
said to be the salary or fees wrongfully received by the defend-
ant, with no deductions for what the plaintiff may have earned
while so ousted.8 5
32 Head v. Porter, 7o Fed., 498; McSorley v. Faulkner, 18 N. Y. Supp.,
460 (right to use telephone); Keener: Quasi-Contracts, 165; Cf. Schil-
linger v. U. S., 55 U. S., 163, and Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 24 Ch. D., 439,
both of which are distinguishable.
as See Ames: History of Assumpsit. Asher v. Wallis, ii Mod., 146.
84 Arris v. Stukely, 2 Mod., 26o; Kreitz v. Behrensrneyer, 149 Ill., 496.
85 Fitzsimmnons v. Brooklyn, io2 N. Y., 536; U. S. v. Addison, 6 Wall.,
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III. TORTS AFFECTING REAL PROPERTY-A. Use and Occu-
pation by Trespassers. As against one who is not a tenant by
virtue of a real agreement, express or implied, the value of the
use of real property has never been recoverable in the action of
assumpsit.3 There is no logical reason for this doctrine, for there
is the same duty and the same unjust enrichment as in other cases.
Certain historical reasons for the refusal to allow assumpsit for
use and occupation against a trespasser have been suggested. For
example, it is said that "it would have been extraordinary had
the courts given a remedy against a tort feasor which they did not
allow on a contract against a tenant. 37 But, with deference, it
would not have been extraordinary at all. There was a good
reason for not extending assumpsit to suits against tenants.
Against them the landlord had another perfectly adequate con-
tractual remedy, the action of debt. In debt for rent reserved the
tenant could not wage his law and the action survived the tenant's
death, so why should the landlord want assumpsitf But against
a trespasser the owner has no right of action in debt. The
trespasser is unjustly enriched, and the plaintiff has as much
need of the remedy in assumpsit as in the case of any other tort
enriching the tort feasor. The reason given by Professor Ames
for not allowing assulnpsit against a trespasser is a better one;
the remedy of indebitatus assumpsit was allowed by special act
of Parliament against a tenant upon a parol demise, and "the
courts could not, without too palpable a usurpation, extend the
count to cases not within the act of Parliament." It would have
drawn too close a parallel between Parliamentary legislation and
judicial legislation."8 If the trespasser occupies under a claim of
right, thus becoming a disseisor, it is doubtless improper to allow
36 Tew v. Jones, 13 M. & W., 12; Smith v. Stewart, 6 Johns. (N. Y.),
46; Ackerman v. Lyman, 20 Wis., 454; Hurley v. Lamoreaux, 29 Minn.,
138. Yet the court had no difficulty in permitting a woman to maintain
assumpsit against a man who had fraudulently induced her into a void
marriage with him, and had then received the rents and profits of her
real property. Asher v. Wallis, ii Mod., 146. And see dictum in Nat'l
Oil Ref. Co. v. Bush., 88 Pa., 335. The case of Mayor v. Saunders, 3 B. &
Adol., 411, where assumpsit was allowed to recover stallage in a public
market appears to be contra, but it may be that the defendant was not a
trespasser in that case.
37 Keener: Quasi-Contracts, 192.
3 The statute was ii Geo., II, c. 19, Sect., 14. See Ames: History of
Assumpsit; also Street: Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. II, p. 217.
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the plaintiff to litigate the question of title in an aftion of
assumpsit.3 9
B. Chattels Severed by Disseisor. If a disseisor of land severs
trees or stone and converts them to his own use, the disseisee
cannot maintain assumpsit4 0 This is because the trees and stone
were not technically the property of the disseisee at the time of
severance. The question of right to the trees depends upon the
larger question of right to the land, and assumpsit is not a proper
action for the trial of that question.
C. In case of trespasses where there is not also a disseisin,
there is usually no enrichment, and so no right to sue in assumpsit.
But if while trespassing without also disseising, the trespasser
commits the further tort of converting property to his own use, it
has been held that a suit in assumpsit will lie.4 1 This should
amount to a waiver of the conversion, and probably also of the
trespass quare clausum. The whole is probably to be regarded as
a single cause of action, and the owner could not maintain both
trespass and trover.
IV. TORTS AFFECTING THE PERSON; LABOR COMPELLED.
Where one has-been enriched by tortiously compelling another to
work for him, that other should have the right to sue in indebi-
tatus assumpsit.42 There exists the combination of duty and en-
richment in this case. The count is for work and labor, quantum
neruit, instead of for money had and received. The remedy in
this case has been refused, however, for mistaken reasons similar
to those in actions for good sold.4s
39 See Lindon v. Hooper, Cowper, 414; Phelps v. Church, 99 Fed.,
683; Downs v. Finnegan, 58 Minn., 112. In fact there is little need of the
remedy in any case; courts have many times shown their disinclination to
extend the remedy; perhaps the refusal here is another illustration of
their disinclination.
40 Keener: Quasi-Contracts, 172; Ames: Disseisin of Chattels, Essays
in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. III, p. 547; Downs v. Finnegan,
58 Minn., 112.
41 Phelps v. Church, 99 Fed., 683 (stone severed); Norden v. Jones,
33 Wis., 6oo (pasturage of trespassing cattle); Welch v. Bagg, 12 Mich.,
42 (pasturage); Powell v. Rees, 7 Adol. & El.,. 426 (coal severed);
Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D., 439 (coal). Cf. Stearns v. Dillingham, 22
Vt., 624.
42 Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind., 44o; Abbott v. Town of Fremont, 34
K. H., 432.
43 Thompson v. Bronk, 126 Mich., 455.
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If one's minor child or apprentice has been forced or enticed
away, and has been induced to serve defendant, thus enriching
him, the parent or master may sue in assumpsit for the value of
the service rendered. 4 ' This rule ought not to apply, however, in
the case of an ordinary servant by contract. If the servant once
finally breaks the service contract, the master is no longer entitled
to his service; and this is true whether the breaking of the con-
tract was due to the defendant's solicitation or not. Hence, even
though the service received by the defendant is of greater value
to him than the wages paid by him, there is no unjust enrichment,
by service to which the plaintiff was entitled. In the case of the
child or apprentice, the relation cannot be conclusively ended with-
out the master's consent, and the master therefore remains en-
titled to the service received by the defendant. The only remedy,
therefore, against one who entices away a servant, is in tort.
One who enriches himself by the use of another's slave is liable
in assumpsit for like reasons; but this is governed by principles
discussed above, in dealing with the conversion of chattels used
and returned.'"
V. GENERAL DOCTRINES-A. Application of the Statute of
Limitations. Statutes of limitation very generally fix one period
of time as sufficient to bar an action on a contract, and a different
period of time to bar an action for a tort. In case a tort is waived
and suit brought in assumpsit, which period applies? Of course
the intention of the legislature should control, but unfortunately
the legislature usually has no intention, and the meaning of the
law must be determined by the reasonable construction of the
words. The statutory words may mean "after the existence of a
cause of action," or they may mean "after the availability of a
form of action." If the words have the latter meaning, no diffi-
culty will arise, and the right to sue in assumpsit will be barred
after the number of years specifically allowed for actions of
assumpsit. However, statutes are not usually so worded as to
refer to forms of action; they usually classify cases according to
the cause of action. Perhaps no difficulty should arise in con-
struing this sort of a statute either, but difficulties have arisen.
"4Lightly v. Clouston, I Taunton, 112; Eades v. Vandeput, 5 East,
39a, 39; Foster v. Stewart, 3 Maule & S., I9I; Hopf v. U. S. Baking Co.,
6 Misc. (N. Y.), I58 (minor child); Keener: Q.-C., i8g.
45 Stockett v. Watkins, 2 G. & J. (Md.), 326; contra, Crow v. Boyd,
17 Ala., Si.
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Suppose a statute limits actions for damages for a tort to three
years after the commission of the tort, and actions on contracts
to six years after the accrual of the cause of action. Then if B
converts A's chattel in igoo, sells it to C in igo, and receives the
price from C in i9o2, how soon is A's remedy against B barred
by the statute? It is clear that A could sue in trespass, trover,
or replevin no later than 19o3. But it has been held that A could
sue B in a count for goods sold, as late as 19o6; 4' and in a
count for money had and received, as late as I9o8.4 The reason
has been given thus: "Since to maintain an action for money
had and received in this class of cases, the plaintiff must prove the
receipt of money by the defendant as well as a wrongful conver-
sion, his cause of action does not arise until the receipt of the pro-
ceeds of the sale; and therefore the Statute of Limitations begins
to run only from that time."48  Professor Keener adds a limita-
tion to the above rule to the effect that if B ,should keep A's chat-
tel until i9o4 and then sell it for money, A could not sue in
assumpsit for that money. This limitation has been sustained in
one excellent decision.49 and this writer has no quarrel with it.
But it is submitted that the rule which it limits is wholly incorrect,
and that the decisions sustaining the rule are faulty unless they.
can be justified by the peculiar wording of the particular statute
to be applied. A's right to sue in assumpsit should be barred at
the same time as is his right to sue in a tort action. 50
In all cases where a tort is waived, there is in fact no contract.
The cause of action is a tort, and the tort exists as the cause of
action and must be proved as the cause of action from first to
last. No trick or legerdemain on the part of the plaintiff can
change the tort into a contract. Neither can the law do this.
The law may allow new forms of action, and may call things by
new names, but it cannot turn a theft or other conversion of
goods into an innocent agreement to sell and to buy. The as-
sumpsit alleged in these cases is a mere fiction and is not the
cause of action. Professor Keener argues convincingly that the
46 Kirkman v. Phillips, G Heisk., 2.
47Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick., 133.
48 Keener: Quasi-Contracts, 175.
49 Currier v. Studley, 159 Mass., 17.
50 This is sustained in principle by Hodsden v. Harridge, 2 Saunders,
64, and other cases holding the contractual period not applicable in the
case of other sorts of quasi-contracts. See note 54 below.
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fiction should never be used to deny a remedy, overthrowing
several cases where it was so used.5  In like manner, it is sub-
mitted, the fiction should not be used to enlarge a right. The
fact that it has been used to dodge the rule that a personal action
dies with the person,5 2 or to expand the right of set-off" which
the common law technically and inconveniently limited, is no
ground for using it to nullify a legislative act based on sound
public policy. It has often been held that in other sorts of quasi-
contracts, the contractual period of limitation does not apply.5"
Perhaps in those cases the tort limitation could be no more logi-
cally applied than the contractual limitation. But in the cases
here considered there is a recognized tort, it is the real cause of
action, and the tort limitation should control.
The proponents of the rule here controverted admit that if the
statutory period for tort actions has gone by before the converter
transfers the thing converted, the count for money had and re-
ceived will never be maintainable. But they assert that if the
thing was transferred the day before the tort remedy was barred,
a new cause of action in assumpsit now arises on receipt of the
proceeds, and will not be barred until the end of the full period
allowed for actions on contracts. "If the title to the property is
in the injured party at the time of the sale (by the converter),
it would seem that the running of the statute subsequent thereto,
but prior to the receipt of the money by the defendant, should
not affect the plaintiff's right. He is equitably entitled to the
debt as the proceeds of his property." It is submitted that this
is incorrect, and that it makes no difference when the sale was
made or when the proceeds were received. The author quoted
above has himself shown over and over again that there is in
fact no new cause of action and never any real contract. Further
than that, it has been convincingly shown that after a conversion
51 Keener: Q.-C.* 210-213; see also pp. 159-16o.
52 See below, V, B.
5 See below, V, C.
54 In Hodsden v. Harridge (1670), 2 Saunder, 64, it was held that the
Statute of 21 Jac. I, c. 16, limiting "all actions of debt grounded upon
any lending or contract without specialty" to six years, did not apply in
an action of debt upon an award. To the same effect, as to other quasi-
contracts, construing the same or a similar statute, are: Talory v. Jack-
son (1633), 3 Croke, 513; Jones v. Pope, i Williams' Saunders, 37;
Wilson v. Towle, 19 N. H., 244; Pease v. Howard, 14 Johns., 479;
Richards v. Bickley, 13 Serg. & R., 395.
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the injured party is at once divested of his title." The act of
conversion operates to change the title, to chattels as to land.
The disseisin changes the ownership into a mere right to obtain
possession. The disseisin and not the statute of limitations passes
title. The statute merely determines the life of the disseisee's
right of action. Further acts of ownership on the part of the
disseisor certainly ought not to assist the disseisee and to enlarge
his right. When the- disseisor sells the thing, he is selling a
thing to which he has title, and as to which the disseisee has
merely a right of action. After the sale, as before, the disseisee
has his right for the remainder of its statutory life. During that
period this right can be made the basis of a quasi-contractual
action of assumpsit, as well as of a tort action. But when the
right expires it cannot be made the basis of anything. There is
then no basis left for assumpsit.
But it may be said that, whether technically so or not, justly
and equitably the thing is the property of the disseisee, and that
therefore the proceeds are his. The answer is that this proves
too much. This contention would be just as applicable the day
after the full period of the statute has elapsed as it was the day
before. As between the parties, the thing still justly belongs to
the disseisee; but he cannot get it, nor can he get the proceeds
of the thing if it is later sold, however justly he may regard them
as his. This is admitted by all. The equity of his case does not
in the least depend upon when the tort feasor sold the chattel or
received the proceeds; hence, it is evident that the injured party's
right to the thing or its proceeds must be determined upon some
other principle than so-called "natural justice."
If the plaintiff should be limited to the three year period on
his count for money had and received, he should be likewise
limited when he sues in a count for the value of goods sold and
delivered. In a case holding the contrary, the following para-
doxical statements were made: "The statute of limitation ap-
plicable to the cause depends upon the nature and character of
the action and not upon its form. In the case before us the com-
plainant has elected to waive the tort and to sue for the value
of the ;property converted, and in so doing he is entitled to the
benefit of the six years statute."58  It is strange that the court
55 Ames: Disseisin of Chattels, Essays in Anglo-American Legal His-
tory, Vol. III, p. 541.
5 Kirkman v. Philips, 7 Heisk., 222.
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did not see that in the second sentence it was denying the ac-
curacy of the first. It erroneously supposed that there was a new
cause of action, really contractual-that the plaintiff could trans-
form water into wine.
B. Survival of Actions. At common law the right of action
for a tort does not survive the death of either the plaintiff or the
defendant. Actio personalis moritur cum persona. This rule
applies to all cases where the tort feasor has caused a damage to
another without himself receiving any property or profit; and
also to cases where the form of action brought is a tort form and
the plea is not guilty, even though there was an enrichment of the
tort feasor57 So the various forms of trespass will not survive,
nor will trover5 8  But actions sounding in contract or quasi-
contract do survive.5 9 So in all cases where the injured party
may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, his tort remedy will not
survive, but his remedy in assumpsit will survive.60 Of course,
this rule is judicial legislation to get rid of the unjust doctrine
of non-survival of actions, in those cases where its injustice is
most apparent. But the whole rule of non-survival of actions
was itself judicial legislation, and there is no reason why it should
not be repealed by its own creator. Of course, if the tort feasor
has not been enriched, he is not liable in assumpsit; and neither
is his personal representative liable, even in equity.61
C. Set-Off and Counterclaim. Difficulties have arisen in con-
struing statutes allowing set-offs, counterclaims, and recoupment.
Of course it is chiefly a matter of statutory construction; but it
is well to know what a quasi-contract is, before so construing a
statute allowing contractual set-offs as to permit a defendant
sued on a promissory note to put in a claim for the value of
W Hambly v. Trott, Cowper, 371. The latter part of this rule of
course does not apply in equity; Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D., 439,
Bagallay, L. J.; nor does it apply in jurisdictions where the forms of
action are abolished.
181d. Of course a personal representative is liable in tort for a tort
committed by him after the death of the decedent. Bishop v'. Knight,
i P. Williams, 4o6.
5 Sollers v. Lawrence, Willes, 413 (customary duty); Perkinson v.
Gilford, Croke Car,, 539 (official duty).60 Bishop v. Knight, i P. Williams, 4o6 (property converted and
sold) ; Head v. Porter, 7o Fed., 498 (profits made by infringing patent);
Ferrill v. Mooney, 33 Tex., 219 (cattle killed and used).
s1 Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370; People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend., 29; Phil-
lips v. Hornfray, 24 Ch. D., 439.
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goods converted by the plaintiff. It is sometimes held that such
statutes permit quasi-contractual set-offs and counterclaims, even
in cases where the quasi-contract is based upon a tort. 2 Liber-
ality in construing these statutes is generally desirable, for it
avoids multiplicity of actions and promotes justice, so there seems
to be no serious objection to allowing a defendant who is sued in
a contract action to waive a tort by the plaintiff and to counter-
claim against him in assumpsit. But it should be done with a
clear understanding that the counterclaim is not contractual and
with a decent amount of respect for the actual meaning of the
words used by the legislature. 68
D. Election of Remedies-i. Against a Sole Tort Feasor.
An investigation may show that there is much incorrect theory on
the subject of election of remedies. It would seem that an elec-
tion by the party having a choice should not be conclusive upon
him, until he has done an act making it impossible for him to
choose again, or making it injurious to the public, or unjust to
the opposite party. That which is an election as against one
party is not necessarily so as against another. The doctrine of
election is really an application of the doctrine of estoppel. In
those cases where an injured party may waive a tort and sue in
assumpsit, he has an election of remedies. But merely bringing
suit in one form should not be regarded as a conclusive election.6
If the plaintiff becomes non-suit or voluntarily dismisses his case,
he may again bring the same action; and if so, there is no rea-
son why he should not be allowed to try the alternative form of
62 Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo., 570; City Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Park Bank,
32 Hun., l05; Downs v. Finnegan, 58 Minn., 112.
63 Similar questions arise under other statutes and have been variously
decided, but they will not be considered here. Ex parte Adamson, L. R.
8 Ch. D., 8o7 (statute of bankruptcy); Milford v. Corn., 144 Mass., 64
(statute allowing suits against the State); People, ex rel. Dusenbury v.
Speir, 77 N. Y., 144 (statute authorizing arrest in civil cases) ; Schillinger
v. U. S., i55 U. S., 163, and Ingram v. U. S., 32 Ct. of CIms., 147 (statute
conferring jurisdiction on the court of claims) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Van
Vooris, 6 S. D., 548 (statute permitting attachment of goods).
04 The cases are not harmonious. See note in Scott's Cases on Q.-C.,
p. 148; Keener: Q.-C., 2o3; article in 16 Law Quar. Rev., i6o. Perhaps
the bringing of a suit in express assumpsit upon a contract voidable for
fraud or infancy, or upon a contract made by an unauthorized agent,
should be regarded as a conclusive election; but even if so, it does not
follow that the bringing of indebitatus assumpsit upon a quasi-contract
founded in tort should be so regarded.
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action the second time.05 The first case may even go so far as a
judgment adverse to the plaintiff without barring his remedy in
another action, but the judgment must not be as to the merits of
his cause of action. 8 So, where one has been sued in express
assumpsit, and sets up infancy as a defense and obtains judg-
ment thereon, he may still be sued in a tort action based on the
same transaction.67  And if the infant's tort be one resulting in
his enrichment, it would seem that he ought to be liable in
indebitatus assumpsit also.68
After one fair and square judgment on the merits, however,
the plaintiff has no right of action remaining in any form. He
has had his day in court. If he elects to sue in tort, and judg-
ment goes against him, he is estopped from suing a second time in
assumpsit.69 Nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. If the
plaintiff gets judgment in his favor in the first action, his whole
cause of action is merged in the judgment, and the same maxim
applies. There is- in this case the additional reason that a second
judgment in another form of action would generally be of little
additional service to the plaintiff. These rules should apply
whether the judgment in the plaintiff's favor has been satisfied
or not.
2. Against Joint Tort Feasors. Various problems arise under
this head, but they are not peculiar to quasi-contracts. In
America, joint tort feasors are severally as well as jointly liable,
and separate judgments in either tort or assumpsit may be
obtained against them. A judgment in assumpsit against one
should not bar a subsequent action against the other, the theory
that bringing indebitatus assumpsit turns a conversion into a sale
being mere fiction.70 The limitation is merely that there shall not
615 Whipple v. Stevens, 25 R. I., 563.
88 Wilbur v. Gilmore, 21 Pick., 250.
68Badger v. Phinney, I5 Mass., 359; Walker v. Davis, i Gray, 509.
8 See above, II, B.8 9Hitchin (or Kitchen) v. Campbell, 2 W. BI., 827; 3 Wils., 304;
Ware v. Percival, 61 Me., 391. But as against one who has committed a
series of trespasses, a judgment in a tort action for one of them will not
har an assumpsit for the others. Powell v. Rees, 7 Adol. & El., 426.
70 Contra: Buckland v. Johnson, 15 C. B., 145; Floyd v. Browne, i
Rawle, 121; Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y., 16i. See Keener: Q.-C., pp.
2o8-212; convincingly overthrowing these contrary decisions. The fiction
of a contract "having been adopted for the purpose of giving a remedy,
under a system in which forms were paramount to substance, it should
not be used for the purpose of denying a remedy." Also see above, I, B.
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be double satisfaction. But will a judgment adverse to the plaintiff
in his action against one of the joint wrongdoers, bar any further
action against another? It is merely suggested here that there
are two reasons why it should. First, the plaintiff has had one
day in court on the issue of whether there was a joint tort or
not. Secondly, it would be unfair to the defendant who won, to
be subjected to a further action for contribution by the second
defendant who lost, in those cases where contribution would be
allowed.70a Perhaps it can be shown that these reasons should not
control. In the case of a joint contract, a judgment in favor of
one of the joint promisors was held to bar a later action against
the other (in a state allowing by statute a severance of actions).71
Even if the contract had been joint and several, perhaps the rea-
sons above given would apply, and would have barred the second
action.
3. Against Successive Tort Feasors. Where A's property is
converted by B, and it later comes into the hands of X, who also
converts it to his own use, A may hold either or both liable, though
he is not entitled to double satisfaction. Here a judgment in
favor of A, in either tort or assumpsit, against either tort feasor,
should not bar an action against the other. It amounts to an
election, so far as the one sued is concerned, and that one cannot
be sued again in any form. But it is no election as against one
not a party to that suit. As to the latter, it is no estoppel, and
election and estoppel are the same thing.
72
Perhaps there is a distinction in case A loses his first suit, this
first suit being against the original converter of the property. If
A sues B, and B gets judgment, this should bar any further suit
against X.7 3 The tortious character of X's act depends upon the
7oa e. g. As in Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn., 455; Palmer v. Wick, etc.
Co., L. R. 1894, App. Cases, 318
71 Cowley v. Patch, I2O Mass., 137.
72 It has been held that where A sued B for money had and received,
obtained a temporary injunction to prevent B from disposing of that
money, and then settled the case by receiving Li,ooo from B but reserving
all rights against X, that A might still sue X in a tort action. Rice v.
Reed (igoo), i Q. B., 54. This decision is correct. An article in i6
Law Quar. Rev., I6o, criticising it, fails to draw the distinction drawn
above between sole tort feasors and joint tort feasors and also makes the
erroneous assumption that by the plaintiff's action he ratified the tort and
turned it into a sale.
78 Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 273.%
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character of B's act, and the character of B's act has been forever
settled. If A were allowed to hold X in the later action, and X
could then hold B for indemnity, this would enable A to hold B
indirectly after having once failed to do so directly, a result un-
just to B. [This is really the only good reason why the discharge
of a principal debtor by the creditor should also discharge the
surety.] If X were in such state that he would have no right
of indemnity against B, the judgment in favor of B should not
bar a suit against X. But as it could not be determined in the
suit between A and X whether or not X will be entitled to indem-
nity from B, probably the only way to avoid the double vexation
of B, is to bold that X is no longer liable to suit. The mere
bringing of assumpsit against B, however, not followed to judg-
ment, does not bar a later suit against X.74  If, on the other
hand, A sues X first and X gets judgment, this should not bar A's
remedy against B. The character of B's act does not depend
upon the character of the act of X. And there is no possibility
of the double vexation of X.
In all the above cases, it is quite immaterial what is the form
of the actions, whether in assumpsit or in tort. Of course, if B
pretended to act as A's agent, then the ratification theory properly
applies, and anything that will amount to a ratification of B's
unauthorized act, will bar an action against X.7 1
4. Question of Title to Converted Goods. In the case of
conversion of chattels, the doctrine of election of remedies is
mingled with the question of the passing of title. It has been
said that a judgment in trespass, trover, or assumpsit against a
converter of goods has the effect of passing title to those goods,
and that therefore a subsequent converter would become nunc
pro tunc an innocent purchaser from the real owner, and so not
be liable in a subsequent action.7 6 It is submitted that this is in-
correct. The judgment does not pass title at all. In so far as title
is passed, it is passed by the original act of conversion or
disseisin.7 7 After the disseisin, the injured party's ownership
has become a right of action, good as against any holder of the
74 Huffman v. Hughlett, ii Lea, 549; Rice v. Reed (igoo), i Q. B., 54.
75Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 273.
76 Buckland v. Johnson, i5 C. B., 145; Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y.,
i61; dictum in Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 273, citing authorities.
77 See Ames: Disseisin of Chattels, III Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History, 567-580.
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article, for the period allowed by the statute of limitations.
When this period has gone by, the title of the disseisor, or his
grantee, formerly limited by an outstanding right of action, now
becomes unlimited. So, if the injured party sues the converter
in trespass, trover, or assumpsit, and judgment is rendered either
for or against him, he cannot thereafter maintain another action
against that defendant for the same cause. But such a judgment
has nothing to do with the passing of title. It is merely a mer-
ger or an estoppel as to the cause of action against that one de-
fendant. If there is no subsequent tort feasor to be sued, then
the plaintiff's right of action is wholly gone, and the defendant's
title is unlimited. If the judgment is in favor of that defendant,
it should estop the plaintiff from again suing any subsequent
grantee, as set forth above; and so the disseisor's previous lim-
ited title becomes now practically unlimited because of the es-
toppel. But if the judgment is against that defendant, thus es-
tablishing that there was a tort (and this would be established
whether the judgment was in tort or in indebitatus assumpsit),
and there is a subsequent grantee, there is now no ground for es-
toppel and there is no merger of the independent cause of action
against the latter tort feasor. There is no excuse for saying that
title has passed; and the subsequent tort feasor should be suable
during the remainder of the period fixed by the statute of limita-
tions, counting from the original conversion." Of course, both
judgments cannot be collected, and if the subsequent tort feasor
is compelled to pay, he ought in general to be subrogated to the
rights of the plaintiff in the judgment against the first tort feasor.
The theory that bringing suit in assumpsit against the first
wrongdoer is a waiver of his tort and a ratification of his act so
as to protect subsequent grantees is well enough in case the first
wrongdoer professed to act on behalf of the injured party, and
made a contract in his name, but in no other cases.79
E. Measure of Recovery. Is the action of indebitatus as-
sumpsit in these cases an action for damages for a tort? Yes, it
is. Except, because of the form of action used, the damage is to
be measured by the value of the goods or use or labor. Other
elements of damage are waived. This is what waiving the tort
and suing in assumpsit really means. It means suing for a par-
tial reparation for the tort. The waiver is really a waiver of a
78 See Ames: Disseisin of Chattels, supra.
79Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 273, and see above, I, B.
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part of the damage. Often this waiver amounts to very little,
because the damage done by the tort is co-extensive with the
value of the chattel or the labor by which the defendant is en-
riched. The amount one gains is the amount of the other's loss.
On the other hand, the waiver is often a substantial one. The
defendant's gain may be less than the plaintiff's loss.
The amount recoverable in assumpsit can never exceed the
defendant's enrichment; s° and further, it ought never to be
allowed to exceed the amount of the plaintiff's injury. The
courts have always based the quasi-contractual action upon the
reason that it could not injure the defendant, but instead would
in many cases be to his advantage.8 ' In rare cases the amount
recoverable has perhaps been allowed to exceed the injury. But
this is probably due to the fact that the court supposed that the
quasi-contract was a different cause of action.8 2 They have seen
clearly enough that the cause of action 'is the same, in cases turn-
ing on the question of remedies and the doctrine of res judicata.
They at once apply the maxim -nemo debet bis vexari PRO EADEM
CAUSA. 8 s
But it may be said that the plaintiff ought to recover the full
amount of the defendant's unholy enrichment because it is un-
just for the defendant to retain any of it. It does not seem so
certain, on examination, that this is true. Is the plaintiff justly
entitled to be put in any better position than he was in before the
tort was committed? If the defendant puts the plaintiff in the
same position, is he not square with the world, or at least with
the plaintiff? Is he not, as against the plaintiff, entitled to keep
anything else that he has obtained? Perhaps the defendant ought
80 H4iganir v. Cotter, 1o2 Wis., 323; Western Ins. Co. v. Towle, 65
Wis., 247. City Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Park Bank, 32 Hun., 1O5, holding
one joint tort feasor liable in assumpsit for the whole sum obtained by
the fraud, even though the defendant never received a portion of that
sum, directly or indirectly, is incorrect.
81 Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burrow, ioo5; Lockwood v. Kelsea, 41
N. H., 185; Lindon v. Hooper, Cowper, 414; Fiquet v. Allison, 12 Mich.,
328; Young v. Marshall, 8 Bing., 43. In Foster v. Stewart, 3 Maule &
S., i9r, it is said by Bayley, J.: "It has often been laid down that you
may waive the tort and bring assumpsit; because in assumpsit the party
cannot recover more than in an action of tort; in many instances he will
recover less."
82 Cf. Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, IO2 N. Y., 536, and U. S. v. Addison,
6 Wall., 291.
88 Hitchin v. Campell, 2 W. BI., 827.
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to be punished for his tort, but if so the fine ought to go to the
state, and it ought to be measured by the character of the wrong,
and not by the amount of the profit made out of it by the defend-
ant. It is true that for some torts punitive damages are assess-
able, and the plaintiff as a prosecutor for the state gets them.
But the desirability of assessing punitive damages has never been
given as a reason for suing in assumpsit, and such damages are
in fact foreign to the character of a contract action.
If express assumpsit had remained what it originally was, an
action for damages for a deceit, certainly the recovery would
never exceed the plaintiff's injury as found. But assumpsit came,
by a process not yet traced in detail,8 4 to be an action for the
breach of an obligation based on consent, and the measure of
damages changed from the amount of damage suffered by the
promisee, to the value of the thing promised, the amount he
would have gained had the promise been performed. This may be
proper and right in actions on real contracts based on consent, but
it is entirely unnecessary and improper to apply the rule to obliga-
tions sounding in tort. In contract, the measure of damages is
the amount of profit the parties might reasonably have fore-
seen would have been gained had the contract been performed.
It is the extent of the disappointment-the amount the promisee
would have been enriched by addition. In tort, the measure of
damages is the amount actually suffered and proximately result-
ing from the wrong, whether that loss could have been foreseen
or not. It is the amount taken away-the amount one has been
deprived of by subtraction. It has been neatly said, the test in
contract is foresight, and in tort it is hindsight."5 So in indebi-
tatus assumpsit for a tort, the measure of damages should be the
same as in a tort action, or at any rate no greater. The legal
fiction should not be indulged to enlarge the right.
In conclusion, it would appear that there is grave doubt as
to the propriety of the whole doctrine of waiver of tort and suit
84 Ames, in his History of Assumpsit, merely says: "By a natural
transition, however, actions upon parol promises came to be regarded as
actions ex contractu. Damages were soon assessed, not upon the theory
of reimbursement for the loss of the thing given for the promise, but
upon the principle of compensation for the failure to obtain the thing
promised."
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in assumpsit, a doubt that has been expressed by many judges.8 6
Perhaps the best thing that can be said of it is that it was a step
in the breaking down of the common law forms of action. The
injured party certainly already had an adequate remedy at law.
The actions of trespass, trover, detinue, and replevin were open
to him. This was not true of other large classes of quasi-con-
tracts, so that the extension of assumpsit to them was necessary.
The courts profess to allow waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit
only in cases where the plaintiff is helped without injuring the
defendant. But in most cases it has in fact injured the defendant.
The defendant has been held by this fiction in cases where the
doctrine of non-survival of actions would have let him go scot
free. Counterclaims have been allowed, where otherwise the
defendant on the counterclaim would not have had to meet it. In
a few cases theamount of the recovery may have been increased.
By the use of this fiction, the defendant's right given him by the
statute of limitations has been cut down. The plaintiff's plead-
ing in all these cases is much less specific, and the defendant
much more likely to be surprised by the case presented at the
trial. It seems certain that in all of these cases the defendant has
been injured, and it has really been for the sake of these injuries
that the right to sue in assumpsit was allowed, thus creating a
new quasi-contractual right. It is true that there are some com-
pensating benefits for the tort feasor, but he might have some in-
terest in deciding as to their weight himself. Difficulties in the
construction of statutes have been increased, the doctrine of
election of remedies has been greatly complicated, and an im-
mense number of conflicting decisions due to misunderstanding
has resulted.
However, the doctrine has been permanently engrafted on the
common law, and it should now be applied along consistent lines
with a correct understanding of the nature of the cause of action
and the character of the remedy. In jurisdictions where the old
forms of action have been totally abolished, there should be
nothing whatever left of the whole doctrine excepting a few
historical echoes.8 7  Arthur L. Corbin.
Yale University Law School.
8" Holt, C. J., in Constable's Case, Comb., 446; Scroggs, C. J., in
Howard v. Wood, T. Jones, 126, 128; Ellenborough, C. J., in Foster v.
Stewart, 3 Maule & S., 191; Martin, B., in Neate v. Harding, 6 Exch.,
349; York v. Toun, 5 Mod., 444, and see Lamine v. Dorrell, 2 Ld. Raym.,
1216.
87 e. g. It should still have an influence in the construction of
statutes. See Ingran v. U. S., 32 Ct. of CIms., 147.
